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Abstract—The fifth generation of wireless cellular networks (5G) is 
expected to be the infrastructure for emergency services, natural 
disasters rescue, public safety, and military communications. 5G, as 
any previous wireless cellular network, is vulnerable to jamming 
attacks, which create deliberate interference to hinder the 
communication of legitimate users. Therefore, jamming 5G networks 
can be a real threat to public safety. Thus, there is a strong need to 
investigate to what extent these networks are vulnerable to jamming 
attacks. For this investigation, we consider the 3GPP standard 
released in 2017, which is widely accepted as the primary reference 
for the deployment of these networks. First, we describe the key 
elements of 5G New Radio (NR) architecture, such as different 
channels and signals exchanged between the base station and user 
equipment. Second, we conduct an in-depth review of the jamming 
attack models and we assess the 5G NR vulnerabilities to these 
jamming attacks. Then, we present the state-of-the-art detection and 
mitigation techniques, and we discuss their suitability to defeat smart 
jammers in 5G wireless networks. Finally, we provide some 
recommendations and future research directions at the end of this 
paper. 
Index Terms—Smart Jamming, 5G New Radio, Frequency Hopping 
Spread Spectrum, Game Theory, Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum, 
Timing Channels, Machine Learning. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fifth generation of wireless cellular networks, 5G, 
promises faster data rates and reliable service delivery. It is 
expected to enable many cutting-edge technologies such as 
internet-of-things (IoTs), self-driving cars, and smart cities. In 
2017, 3GPP released the specification of 5G New Radio (NR), 
which has been the primary reference for the deployment of 
these networks. 5G NR architecture is built upon five 
fundamental pillars: New radio spectrum, massive 
MIMO/beamforming, multi-connectivity, network flexibility, 
and high level of security. 5G is operable on a new radio 
spectrum from below 1 GHz to up to 100 GHz. The 5G NR 
physical layer uses orthogonal frequency division modulation 
(OFDM) with a cyclic prefix on the downlink and either the 
OFDM or discrete Fourier transform-spread OFDM for uplink. 
The 5G NR frame is of 10 ms duration, in which there are ten 
sub-frames and fourteen OFDM symbols. 5G NR supports both 
the frequency division multiplexing FDD and time division 
multiplexing TDD modes [1]. 
As any wireless cellular networks, 5G networks are built 
upon open sharing in which the communication medium is the 
free space making them prone to interference, which is one of 
the fundamental causes of degradation of the performance of 
wireless networks. If the level of obstruction is high, the 
receivers are not able to decode the transmitted signals. This 
weakness can be used by some adversary nodes to cause 
intentional interference and hinder legitimate user’s 
communication over specific wireless channels. This is well-
known as jamming attacks. 
Jamming attacks pose serious risks to public communication 
services [2], [3]. In early 1900, jamming attacks were used in 
military battles. Nowadays, jamming attacks can be launched 
to hinder public communication services. Several jammer 
devices are available in the market at a low cost. In addition, 
the most sophisticated jamming attacks can be implemented 
with a price as low as 1k$ using low-cost software-defined 
radio tools, and some primary programming skills. 
Furthermore, 5G is expected to be the infrastructure for 
emergency services, natural disasters rescue, public safety, 
and military communications making jamming attacks a real 
threat. 
Therefore, one of the central requirements of 5G NR is a 
high level of security and resilience to jamming attacks [3]. 5G 
is expected to enhance the security of wireless networks and 
fix the breaches of long-term evolution (LTE) or 4G networks, 
especially the resilience to jamming attacks. In 2017, 3GPP 
released the 5G NR standard. Before deploying these cellular 
networks, one needs to investigate to what extent the 5G 
standard released by 3GPP is resilient to jamming attacks, and 
build security protocol that can be incorporated in this 
standard. Thus, it is essential to determine under which 
conditions (e.g., the power of the jammer, the duty cycle, etc.), 
the jammer can take down the communication channel; and 
to determine which anti-jamming techniques are suitable for 
5G NR. 
In this paper, we aim to provide an in-depth study of these 
issues, assess the risks of jamming attacks on 5G NR, and 
suggest some possible future research directions on how to 
efficiently tackle this problem. The main inputs of this article 
can be summarized as follows: 
• Description of the key elements of 5G NR architecture 
• Review of jamming attack models and strategies 
• Assessment of jamming vulnerabilities of the 5G NR 
• Review of detection and mitigation techniques and 
discussion of their suitability to defeat smart jammers in 
5G 
• Conclusions, recommendations, and future research 
directions 
The remaining sections of this paper are arranged as follows. 
Section II describes the 5G NR architecture. Section III defines 
jamming attack strategies, types, and models. The overall 5G 
NR vulnerability to jamming attacks assessment is provided in 
Section IV. Section V revisits briefly the state-of-the-art anti-
jamming and mitigation techniques and discusses their 
suitability for 5G NR. Section VI summarizes the results of this 
work and draws the conclusions. 
II. 5G NR ARCHITECTURE 
5G NR is operable on from low to very high-frequency bands 
(0.6-30GHz). It gives ultra-wide carrier bandwidth, which can 
be up to 100 MHz in below 6 GHz and up to 400 MHz in higher 
than 6 GHz. In 5G NR, there are several physical channels. For 
instance, for the downlink, there is downlink shared channel 
(PDSCH), Broadcast channel (PBCH), and downlink control 
channel (PDCCH). For the uplink, there is uplink shared channel 
(PUSCH), uplink control channel (PUCCH), and Random access 
channel (PRACH). 
The physical layer of 5G NR includes many types of signaling 
reference signals and synchronization pilots exchanged on 
both downlink and uplink. For instance, the base station uses 
the primary synchronization signal (PSS) and secondary 
synchronization signal (SSS) for downlink frame 
synchronization and conveying cell-ID to user equipment (UE). 
The PSS has three possible combinations, while the SSS has 336 
combinations. Each of the PSS and SSS consists of an m 
sequence of length 127, and is mapped to a set of 127 
subcarriers within the same OFDM symbol, different OFDM 
symbols, respectively. The use of the Gold sequence, which is 
formed by combining two orthogonal m-sequences, enables 
the UE to differentiate between several base stations on the 
same carrier at a low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) [4]. 
5G NR enables scalable NR numerology to address different 
radio spectrum, bandwidths, and services. For instance, 
subcarrier spacing (SCS) of 15, 30, 60, and 120 kHz is specified 
for macro coverage, small cell, indoor, and mmWave, 
respectively. 5G NR frame is similar to the one of 4G/LTE with 
some slight modifications. One slot in the 5G NR frame is 
composed of 14 symbols, and the slot length is dependent 
upon the CSC. Mini-slot is comprised of 2, 4, and 7 symbols, 
which can be allocated for shorter transmissions. Slots can be 
aggregated for more extended periods of communication. The 
OFDM symbol contains PSS, PBCH, and SSS. 
For the coding schemes, 5G NR uses low-density parity 
check (LDPC) for the data channel and polar coding for the 
control channel. It has been shown that LDPC codes perform 
well when used for error correction for small chunks of data. 
Polar coding, on the other hand, can achieve performance 
close to the Shannon limit, but it has to be used with large 
pieces of data. 
Another feature of 5G NR is the use massive Multiple input 
multiple output (MIMO) to enhance the coverage and the 
capacity of wireless cells [5]–[8]. 
III. JAMMING ATTACKS 
Jammers can be defined as malicious wireless nodes planted 
by an adversary to cause intentional interference in wireless 
cellular networks. Depending on its attacking strategy, one can 
identify several types of jammers. In the following, we provide 
the most common types of jammers and describe their 
strategies. 
1) Regular jammer: In this type, the jammers tend to not 
follow any MAC protocol before continually injecting radio 
frequency signals without gaps in between, which can be 
either legitimate bit sequences or random bit sequences to 
interfere with legitimate transmitted signals over a wireless 
channel. Subsequently, these bits occupy the transmission 
channel to starve transmissions initiated by legitimate nodes. 
This type of attack uses enormous power, which drains the 
battery life of the malicious node due to its continuous 
transmission of radio signals. Regular jammers, consequently, 
require a high amount of power to carry out this attack. On the 
other hand, regular jammers do not need to monitor the 
activity of legitimate users [9]–[11]. 
2) Delusive jammer: In this type, known also as 
deceptive, jammers continuously inject legitimate sequence of 
bits into the communication channel. This type of jammer 
often misleads the receiver to believe that this is a message 
from a legitimate source. It forces the receiver to wait in the 
listening states. In comparison with regular jammer, delusive 
jammer tends to be quite challenging to detect because of the 
similarity between the fake signal and the legitimate one [10], 
[11]. 
3) Random jammer: Different from both regular and 
deceptive jammers, random jammers conserve their energy by 
alternating between active and idle states. During the 
jamming process, the malicious node jams for a 
predetermined period before turning off its radio. After a 
while, it reactivates the jamming process from the sleep mode 
and continually follows that pattern. During the jamming 
mode, it can exhibit either regular or deceptive jamming 
feature, while during the idle state, it conserves energy and 
therefore reducing its power consumption [9]–[11]. 
4) Responsive jammer: All of the three previous 
jamming strategies discussed before are active jammers, as 
they attempt to block the communication channel, regardless 
of the activity pattern of the legitimate nodes. An alternative 
to active jammers to reduce its power consumption is to be a 
quick responsive jammer, known also as reactive jammers, 
which can be a more power-efficient method. Responsive 
jammers continually monitor the communication channel, and 
transmit only of the transmitter is active [9], [10], [12], [13]. 
Responsive jammers minimize power consumption despite 
the monitoring activity for the power required is far less than 
the one necessary to jam a communication channel. For 
instance, the authors of [7] launched a jamming attacks using 
deep learning. 
5) Go-next jammer: This jammer is selective because it 
targets one frequency channel at a time. If the transmitter 
detects the existence of a jammer over the frequency channel 
and hops to the next frequency, this kind of jammer follows on 
the transmitter and goes to the next frequency channel. Due 
to its selective nature, go-next jammer conserves its energy. 
Notwithstanding, if the transmitter performs fast rate 
frequency hopping, the jammer’s energy can be wasted 
because of the successive hops [11]. 
6) Control channel jammers: This jammer targets the 
control channel to block the exchange between the 
transmitter and the receiver before initiation of the 
communication. Control channel jammer can be of several 
types and can cause a denial of service and even denies nodes 
access to the network [11], 
[14]. 
IV. VULNERABLENESS OF NR TO JAMMING ATTACKS 
A. Vulnerableness of the PBCH to Jamming 
Base station PBCH are assigned symbols within two slots of 
each other if the carrier is below 3 GHz and within four slots if 
the carrier frequency is above 3 GHz [4]. As higher the sub-
carrier spacing (SCS), the duration of one slot is smaller, and 
the selective jamming duty cycle is lower. Consequently, a 
selective jammer can target the PBCH using a shallow duty 
cycle as the symbols are close to each other in both cases. This 
design is a vulnerability in design even that the use of higher 
frequency does not propagate for a long-distance making the 
jammer getting closer to the mobile station to launch its 
attacks. A localization-based detection technique can identify 
the source of the jammer and stop it. However, if the jammer 
is mobile, the anti-jamming has to monitor the mobility of the 
jammer to detect the next jammer positions. The longer the 
monitoring process, the harmful the jamming is going to be. 
B. Vulnerableness of PDCCH to Jamming 
CORESET is a set of physical resources (i.e, a specific area on 
5G NR Downlink Resource Grid) and a set of parameters that 
are used to carry PDCCH. It is equivalent to LTE PDCCH area 
(the first fourth OFDM symbols in a subframe). But in LTE 
PDCCH region, the PDCCH always spread across the whole 
channel bandwidth, but NR CORESET region is localized to a 
specific region in the frequency domain. Jamming PDCCH 
channel is far more complicated than jamming PBCH channel. 
To jam PDCCH, the jammer has to cram all the possible 
locations in which the PDCCH resides, assuming that the 
jammer does not have any knowledge of the CORESET freq-
domain. However, the jammer can intercept and decode the 
CORESET freq-domain, which gives the jammer and advantage 
to jam specific sub-carrier, using a small duty cycle depending 
upon the value of CORESET-time-duration. The question is how 
long it can take to intercept and decode the CORESET. 
C. Vulnerableness of PUCCH to Jamming 
The PUCCH has an option for intra-slot hopping, which can 
provide some protection against selective jammer, but the 
robustness of this defense mechanism is dependent on the 
hopping rate. Also, this information is available to the jammer 
as the 5G standard is public. Thus, knowing the intra-slot 
hopping gives the jammer an advantage to jam PUCCH at low 
cost. Furthermore, the PUCCH is modulated with MPSK (m=2 
or 4) and polar code or just repetition code as an error coding 
scheme depending on the number of bits to be transmitted. 
Polar codes are well known by their low protection against 
jamming attacks. 
D. Vulnerableness of RACH to Jamming 
The random access (RA) procedure is the uplink 
transmission of a random access preamble by the UE on a 
dedicated RACH. After the reception of a preamble, the base 
station estimates temporal synchronization parameters and 
allocates radio resources for further communication with the 
UE. The synchronization parameters and allocation of radio 
resources are then communicated to the UE that initiated the 
RA procedure within a specified time after the RA preamble 
transmission [15]. This information is broadcasted on PRACH, 
which takes the form of a Zadoff-Chu sequence that embeds a 
value used to identify the UE temporarily. Despite the large 
number of possible locations, and the high complexity needed 
to determine the positions in real-time, jamming PRACH is still 
feasible [4]. Furthermore, if the jammer does not succeed in 
determining these locations, it can flood the channel with an 
invalid preamble as the 5G NR does not specify what it should 
be done in this scenario. 
E. Vulnerableness of Massive MIMO to Jamming 
Many research studies (industrial and academic) showed 
that massive MIMO are vulnerable to jamming attacks. 
Jamming MIMO systems targets the channel estimation of 
these systems. By targeting the channel estimation procedure, 
an adversary may launch active jamming attacks against 
unsuspecting users. The authors of [16] presented several 
jamming methodologies for SVD-based MIMO systems, 
including a powerful and practical channel rank attack. The 
authors presented several attack strategies to undermine 
Alamouti STBCbased MIMO scheme. Such attacks have been 
proven feasible by way of analysis, simulations, and real-world 
experimentation. Additionally, the attack strategies presented 
are general and remains valid for massive MIMO systems. 
Therefore, preserving accurate channel estimation under 
jamming attacks is quintessential to gain the desired 
performance enabled by massive MIMO. Hence, there is an 
urgent need for developing techniques for accurate channel 
state estimation whose performance is not impacted by the 
presence of jammers, or at least it considers the presence of 
the jammer and estimate the channel state information from 
affected pilot samples. 
F. Robustness of 5G NR Channel Coding to Jamming 
3GPP specifications for 5G radio standard includes polar 
coding and LDPC coding techniques. Polar coding which uses 
the channel polarization to split the channel into good channel 
and worse channel and transmit only on the good channel, 
presents several advantages but have some limitations. LDPC 
codes on the other hand if used with large block, the 
complexity of the decoder increase exponentially. Most of the 
control channels use polar coding as error coding scheme, and 
the data channels use LDPC coding. It has been shown that 
polar coding is vulnerable to jammers. At 0dB SNR, the bit 
error rate is so high. Likewise, LDPC coding are vulnerable to 
jamming attacks. 
V. ANTI-JAMMING IN 5G 
In this section, we review the anti-jamming techniques. We 
divided this section into three parts: the first part presents 
jamming detection methods, the second part deals with 
mitigation methods, and the last part provide a discussion on 
the effectiveness of these techniques in tackling jamming 
attacks in 5G. 
A. Detection of Jamming Attacks 
Detection of smart-jamming attacks is feasible by 
monitoring any excess amount of energy on a specific physical 
channel (e.g. using masking) or any sudden change in the 
performance of the communication over this channel. A 
common strategy in jamming detection is the use of a 
threshold with some performance metrics such as the packet 
delivery ratio (PDR), packet drop ratio (PDR), bit error rate 
(BER), and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). These techniques 
monitor the level of these metrics during the absence and the 
presence of jamming attacks and set manually the threshold 
for detection. Threshold based detection are only efficient 
when we are dealing with constant jammer. In addition, 
because of the wireless environment dynamics, these 
methods have a high false alarm. 
Another detection category is statistical based [17], [18]. 
The concept of these techniques often uses historical data and 
compute some statistic to distinguish jammed signal from a 
non-jammed signal. Statistical detection of jamming is 
investigated with different forms of jamming attacks, and can 
achieve high accuracy when dealing with constant jammers. 
The last category is machine learning based. Several 
machine learning techniques such as random forest, decision 
tree, adaptive boosting, support vector machine, and 
expectation maximization are investigated in detecting 
jamming attacks [19]. Recently, deep learning which is a 
special case of machine learning is heavily investigated to 
detect jammers [7]. Deep learning can detect jammers with 
high accuracy. Nevertheless, deep learning presents some 
limitations. There is no public dataset that can be used to train 
machine learning models. Most of the proposed methods 
generated dataset using simulations and only a few papers 
have conducted real-world setup to collect data. It is hard to 
foretell the performance of these detection techniques under 
a real jamming attacks. 
B. Mitigation of Jamming Attacks 
5G networks are going to use frequency higher than 30 GHz. 
Jamming these bands are not likely to happen because the 
jammer need high level of power to jam these bands [4]. In 
addition, 5G is going to implement techniques such as direct 
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) and frequency hopping 
spread spectrum (FHSS) [20]. One need to investigate to which 
extent these techniques can act against jamming at the 5G 
physical layer. 
1) Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum: spread spectrum 
can provide protection against interfering jamming signals 
with finite power. This technique purposely makes the 
information bearing signal occupy a bandwidth larger that of 
the minimum necessary to transmit it. Thus, the signal is 
transmitted through the channel undetected by an 
eavesdropper. In direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), the 
data signal is multiplied with a pseudo-noise (PN) sequence. 
The data signal is a narrow band and the PN sequence is 
wideband making the product nearly have a spectrum as same 
as PN which plays the spreading code role. The resilience of 
this technique against jamming attacks depends upon the 
spreading factor. An example of the protection that DSSS 
provides is shown by the authors of [21], in which a BPSK 
modulated signal is considered and if N = 4095 and the BER is 
not to exceed 105, the authors showed the data at the receiver 
can be detected reliably even the jamming power is more than 
400 times the received signal power. This example shows that 
direct sequence spread spectrum is powerful against 
interference jamming. Nevertheless, DSSS has some 
limitations such as the larger bandwidth required and the 
complexity of this techniques which can be an obstacle to 
implement them in some wireless devices. In addition, it has 
been shown that time division multiple access which uses DSSS 
can be cracked on real-time and detect the PN code. by having 
access to such information, the jammer can launch a follow-
on jamming to hinder the communication of its target as low 
cost. 
2) Frequency-hop Spread Spectrum: DSSS techniques 
are powerful yet they impose some practical limits because of 
the capabilities of the physical devices used to generate the 
PN sequence. Specifically, it may turn that the generated 
processing gain is still not large enough to overcome the 
effects of some jammers, which is same cases, resort to 
different strategies. One way to get around this problem is by 
randomly hopping the data modulated carrier from one 
frequency to another [22], [23]. In this type of spread 
spectrum, the spectrum of the transmitted signal is spread 
sequentially instead of instantaneously. One characteristic of 
Frequency-hop is the hopping rate, based on which one can 
distinguish between two types: 
• Slow-rate hopping: Several modulated symbols are 
conveyed within one frequency hop before it hops to the 
next frequency. 
• Fast-rate hopping: is the converse of the slow-frequency 
hopping, which means one symbol rate is transmitted 
during several frequency hops. 
Using frequency hopping has many limitations. For instance, 
using a slow-rate hopping does not provide a robust protection 
against smart jammer as this jammer can find the next hop 
before the transmitter switches to the next frequency; and 
using a fast-rate hopping can decrease the performance of the 
communication channel as it becomes hard to synchronize the 
transmitter and the receiver. In addition, frequency hopping 
requires a pre-shared key between the transmitter and the 
receiver to agree on the hopping pattern, exchanging the keys 
can be intercepted by an eavesdropper. The authors of [24] 
proposed a secretive adaptive frequency hopping scheme for 
5G. The authors of [25] proposed a pseudo-random time 
hopping for anti-jamming in 5G wireless networks. The authors 
analytically evaluated the performance of the proposed 
scheme by determining the jamming probability, the switching 
rate, and bit error rate. The authors of [26] proposed a 
frequency hopping for 5G mmWave. Yet, there is need to 
evaluate the impact of frequency hopping on outage 
probability for 5G mmWave. 
3) Game Theory: Game theory is another anti-jamming 
techniques that aim to find the optimal strategy to defeat 
jammers [8], [27]–[29]. Legitimate users can avoid the 
jamming attacks by proactively hopping among accessible 
channels and thereby minimizing the payoff function. The anti-
jamming in this context is expressed as a game between the 
legitimate user and the jammer. Game theory can be used to 
find the optimal strategy to cope with a jammer such as 
hopping to the next frequency. Several researchers have 
shown that it is possible to achieve the Nash equilibrium, 
meaning that the transmitter can find the optimal strategy to 
cope with the jammer. 
4) Timing channels: The timing channel restores the 
communication between legitimate users under jamming 
attacks instead of frequency hopping. The timing channel is 
reinstated over the jammed channel using the timing patterns 
of attacker [30], [30]. This information enables the transmitter 
to transmit only when the jammer is in the idle-state. The 
timing channel requires the detection step before the creation 
of the timing channel. 
5) UAVs and Reinforcement learning: An unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) aided 5G wireless communication 
framework is yet another anti-jamming strategy. The UAVs are 
used as a relay scheme if the base station is heavily jammed. 
The UAVs use deep reinforcement learning techniques to 
determine the optimal relay policy for mobile users in 5G 
cellular networks. Examples of solutions based on UAVs and 
Deep reinforcement learning have been proposed in [6], [31]–
[34]. This solution could be useful because of the flexibility the 
UAVs give to the network to avoid the jammer. Nevertheless, 
this framework faces many challenges, and UAVs themselves 
are also vulnerable to jammers, and its power supply is limited. 
6) Suppression of Jammers: Massive MIMO suppression 
is a potential technique that can be enhanced and used to deal 
with jamming, and it does not require any change in the 5G NR 
specification [35]. The solution to interference is to build 
robust channel coding schemes that can correct packets 
corrupted by the jammers. This strategy can exhaust the 
jammer. 
To improve the resilience of 5G systems to jamming attacks, 
the authors of [36] proposed a jamming-resistant receiver 
scheme. The prominent feature of this proposed scheme is 
that, in the pilot phase, the base station estimates estimate 
both the jamming channel. The jamming channel estimate is 
then exploited to build linear receiver filters that reject the 
impact of the jamming signal. The authors of [37] proposed a 
mitigation technique based on random matrix theory. 
7) Scheduling and Deep Learning: 5G wireless network 
functions SDN and NFV alongside deep learning can help in 
building intelligent dynamic radio resource allocation and 
scheduling, which can significantly reduce the risk of jamming 
attacks. For instance, the authors of [38] proposed the joint 
power control and scheduling problem in jammed networks 
under minimum QoS constraints without any prior about the 
jammer positions. If combined with Deep learning to learn the 
strategy of the jammer, scheduling can achieve better 
performance. 
C. Effectiveness of Mitigation Techniques and Future Research 
Directions 
Direct spread spectrum techniques can achieve high 
protection against jamming attacks. However, the complexity 
of this technique can be an obstacle to the implementation of 
this technique. Frequency hopping techniques are not suitable 
to counter jammers because the latter can predict the next 
channels, and any exchange between the receiver and the 
transmitter can be intercepted [20]. Machine learning based 
anti-jamming schemes are not practical for some applications 
in 5G wireless networks as it requires long training time and it 
requires building large comprehensive dataset to have reliable 
detection accuracy. Timing channels can be reliable if 
combined with excellent detection technique. UAVs based 
mitigation is a promising solution, but further investigation of 
the practical issues should be considered. 
Thus, further research studies on anti-jamming techniques 
are highly needed. The cyber-security requirement of 5G NR 
has to be embedded in the initial design of these networks. In 
this way, one can ensure a low-cost deployment, in contrast, 
to develop solutions to deal with future failures. For instance, 
base station must implement anti-jamming techniques. For 
example, if the exchange between the base station and user 
equipment, the base station should provide a spatial retreat, 
movement, time, and network reconfiguration. 
Another future research direction is the use of a deep 
learning based approach can be used as anti-jamming. To train 
deep learning, a large comprehensive dataset is needed. For 
that, a real-world setup is needed. To collect data, different 
jammers should be considered. Data collection should be done 
under both scenarios, under jamming and under the normal 
scenario. The built dataset can be used to train and test deep 
learning techniques. Then, these techniques can be combined 
with sensing to detect the strategy of the jammer and actively 
select the communication channel that is not under jamming 
attacks. Deep learning models have to be trained to recognize 
a jamming signal from a legitimate user on the fly. Only if that 
can be performed, then the legitimate user can identify the 
pattern of the jammer and dedicate its strategy and 
accordingly define a mitigation hopping. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented an in-depth study of the 
vulnerability of 5G wireless systems to smart jamming attacks. 
We reviewed different types of jammers, and we showed that 
5G NR enhanced the resilience of wireless cellular network to 
jamming attacks, primarily because of its flexible and dynamic 
resource allocation, yet 5G NR is still far from being secure 
against jamming attacks. The anti-jamming strategies 
presented in this paper address simple jamming attacks and 
are not very suitable for 5G NR. Thus, further research studies 
on anti-jamming techniques are highly needed. 
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